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ANYONE CAN “THINK LIKE A LAWYER”:   
HOW THE LAWYERS’ MONOPOLY ON LEGAL 
UNDERSTANDING UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY 
AND THE RULE OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
Bridgette Dunlap* 
INTRODUCTION 
Though a person needs a threshold understanding of the law to obey it or 
enjoy its protection, lawyers in the United States enjoy a near monopoly on 
knowledge of what the law is and how it works.1  Widespread ignorance of 
the law robs it of deterrent effect, deprives those whose rights have been 
violated of recourse, and undermines deliberative democracy.  This Article 
argues that the low level of legal knowledge in the United States is 
fundamentally at odds with the ideal of the rule of law and further 
contemplates a “legal empowerment alternative” for the United States, 
inspired by the approach that Stephen Golub has argued should supplant our 
lawyer-focused efforts to build democracies abroad.2 
In the U.S. context, legal empowerment would not only require expanded 
access to legal services, but also a significant commitment to increasing the 
basic knowledge of nonlawyers.  The American legal profession has an 
opportunity, if not an obligation, to work to counteract the detrimental 
effects of both the monopoly on legal services and the near monopoly on 
legal knowledge by promoting and providing basic legal education for the 
laypeople that the law binds and protects.  Laypeople need to be 
empowered to think more like lawyers; but for this to happen, lawyers will 
need to “think less like lawyers and more like agents of social change.”3 
Part I of this Article argues that failures of the dominant “lawyer-
centered” attempts of U.S. legal reformers to build democracies and the rule 
of law abroad—and the strategies developed to address those failures—
 
*  Human Rights Fellow, Leitner Center for International Law and Justice, Fordham 
University School of Law; J.D., 2012, Fordham University School of Law.  The author 
thanks the participants of the Colloquium, The Legal Profession’s Monopoly on the Practice 
of Law, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2563 (2014), the staff of the Leitner Center, Tracy Higgins, 
Martin Flaherty, Steven Thel, Russell Pearce, Bryan Berry, and Emily Wolf. 
 1. See James Boyd White, The Invisible Discourse of the Law:  Reflections on Legal 
Literacy and General Education, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 143, 144–45 (1983) (characterizing 
the frustrating and unpredictable mix of the foreign and familiar in legal language for the 
layperson as a kind of disenfranchisement). 
 2. See generally Stephen Golub, The Legal Empowerment Alternative, in PROMOTING 
THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD:  IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 161 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006). 
 3. Id. at 162. 
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should inform efforts to comport with the rule of law ideal at home.  
Particularly in a legal system as complex as the United States, the rule of 
law would require basic legal knowledge and literacy among the public.  
Part II examines the public misperception of lawyers as general experts 
with exclusive access to legal knowledge and argues that laypeople need a 
better understanding of some of the limitations and peculiarities of the 
lawyer’s work in order to understand the legal system, view the law as 
legitimate, and participate in its reform.  Part III examines public ignorance 
of basic legal principles through an example of battery in tort and criminal 
law:  the recent rash of incidents of young people taking and distributing 
photographs of sexual batteries they do not recognize as crimes indicates 
widespread ignorance of the law, which seriously undermines deterrence 
and deprives victims of recourse.  Part IV first argues that the ABA’s 
domestic access to justice programs focused on improving access to counsel 
and mandating civics education should include efforts to empower the 
public with basic legal knowledge and next considers some approaches to 
doing so. 
I.  LESSONS LEARNED FROM EFFORTS TO EXPORT THE U.S.  
MODEL OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
My interest in lawyer monopolies began in Cambodia, where the 
influence of American legal reformers has contributed to the establishment 
of a very small, protectionist bar that enjoys a monopoly on the provision of 
legal services.4  The resulting lack of legal counsel deprives most of the 
population of access to justice and perpetuates major human rights abuses.  
The well-intentioned work to build an American-style legal profession in 
Cambodia is part of the decades-long, billion-dollar effort of the United 
States and other nations to foster democracy by establishing “the rule of 
law” in developing and postconflict countries.5  Definitions of the rule of 
law vary widely,6 but in its thinnest conception the term refers to “universal 
rules uniformly applied.”7  A thicker conception requires that those rules be 
substantively just. 
 
 4. See generally Bridgette Dunlap, The Rule of Law Without Lawyers:  American 
Legal Reformers and the Cambodia Lawyer Shortage (Apr. 12, 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2424255. 
 5. Promoting lawyer monopolies and high standards for lawyer education is central to 
this agenda. See generally Samuel J. Levine & Russell G. Pearce, Rethinking the Legal 
Reform Agenda:  Will Raising the Standards for Bar Admission Promote or Undermine 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Rule of Law?, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1635, 1638–42 (2009) 
(describing the reform agenda of promoting higher educational standards for bar admission). 
 6. See Rachel Kleinfield, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law, in PROMOTING THE 
RULE OF LAW ABROAD:  IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 2, at 31, 32 (identifying five 
different usages for the term “rule of law”:  (1) a government that obeys the law and respects 
judicial rule, (2) law and order, (3) lack of equality before the law, (4) enforced human 
rights, and (5) efficient and predictable justice). 
 7. Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule-of-Law Orthodoxy, in PROMOTING THE RULE 
OF LAW ABROAD:  IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 2, at 75.  Joseph Raz points to the 
inadequacies of the rule of law, writing: 
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There is little empirical evidence for, and much scholarly criticism of, the 
claim that the rule of law project is effective in reforming legal systems, 
improving access to justice, building democracy, or alleviating poverty.8  
Despite this, the dominant paradigm, which Stephen Golub has termed the 
“rule of law orthodoxy,” endures.9  Donor projects seek to build legal 
systems in our own image by training judges and lawyers, upgrading 
courtrooms, buying furniture and computers, drafting laws, establishing 
court administration systems, and building up bar associations.10  These 
efforts to “win the hearts and minds of the judicial and political elite” to 
bring about reform often fail, because the corruption and dysfunction in the 
existing system benefits those elites.11 
Projects typical of the rule of law orthodoxy involve the “rule of 
lawyers,” who Golub tells us may lack any development experience, be 
shortsighted about the failings of their own legal systems, and fail to 
recognize that attorneys are part of the problem in some societies where 
self-serving bar associations limit access to justice, work against social and 
economic equality, or subordinate the interests of the poor to those of 
attorneys or their clients.12  Western “legal missionaries”13 seek to pass 
laws and build strong judicial systems, but there is little reason to believe 
that the public will have access to those institutions, the laws will be fairly 
applied, or that social or economic equality will result. 
Golub has proposed a “legal empowerment alternative” to the rule of law 
orthodoxy, consisting of the use of legal services to advance freedoms, 
particularly those of the marginalized.14  However, his conception of “legal 
services” is broader than that typical in the United States.  Beyond litigation 
and lawyer-provided legal advice, “legal services” include enhancing 
people’s legal knowledge through training, media, and public education, 
 
It is to be insisted that law is only one of the values that a legal system may 
possess and by which it is to be judged.  It is not to be confused with democracy, 
justice, equality (before the law or otherwise), human rights of any kind or respect 
for person or the dignity of man.  A non-democratic legal system, based on the 
denial of human rights, on extensive poverty or racial segregation, sexual 
inequalities and religious persecution may, in principle, conform to the 
requirements of the rule of law better than any of the legal systems of the more 
enlightened Western democracies. 
JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 210, 211 (2d ed. 
1979). 
 8. See, e.g., JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM:  AMERICAN LAWYERS AND 
FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA (1980); STEPHEN HUMPHREYS, THEATRE OF THE RULE OF 
LAW:  TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL INTERVENTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2012); Golub, 
supra note 2, at 105–36. 
 9. Golub, supra note 2, at 108–09. 
 10. Id. at 109. 
 11. Fran Quigley, Growing Political Will from the Grassroots:  How Social Movement 
Principles Can Reverse the Dismal Legacy of Rule of Law Interventions, 41 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 13, 50 (2009). 
 12. Golub, supra note 2, at 127. 
 13. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Primacy of Society and the Failures of Law and 
Development, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 209, 237 (2011). 
 14. See Golub, supra note 2, at 163. 
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and developing services by laypeople who impart knowledge to others in 
their communities.15 
Though the United States generally treats the rule of law as something 
we must build in foreign countries that already exists here, the reality is in 
fact far from the ideal.16  Here, the solutions that the United States promotes 
in foreign countries are in place—voluminous legislation, a powerful 
judiciary, and a specially educated legal profession—but they create 
barriers to the layperson’s understanding and enjoyment of the protections 
of the law and ability to play a meaningful role in shaping it.  American law 
is extremely complex—thanks to American lawyers—making access to 
legal services imperative for one to enjoy equal application of the law.  The 
United States doesn’t suffer from a shortage of lawyers like Cambodia, but 
it does have a shortage of affordable legal services nonetheless.  The 
“extreme reluctance” of the federal and state governments to make lawyer-
provided services available to those of little means, as well as the bar’s near 
complete refusal to permit nonlawyer services to address the resulting need, 
is a rejection of the fundamental norm of uniform application of the law.17  
As Frank Upham notes, the policy judgment that uniform application of the 
law is not worth significant resources indicates that Americans do not 
believe that the rule of law is imperative for economic growth and stability, 
as our rule of law promoters claim abroad.18 
Even if affordable legal services somehow became widely available in 
the United States, however, the fact would remain that enjoying equal 
application of the law and participating fully in a society as legalistic and 
litigious as the United States requires a threshold level of legal 
understanding.19  But our law’s complexity and the lawyers’ monopoly 
have led to a pervasive perception of law as the exclusive domain of 
lawyers, such that even highly educated laypeople may lack basic legal 
understanding.20 
As Robert Gordon has recognized, “few other than the lawyers 
themselves have ever perceived the unique virtues of the courts and 
 
 15. Id. at 165. 
 16. See Upham, supra note 7, at 83–90 (surveying the ways that the reality in the United 
States does not match the rule-of-law model); see also HUMPHREYS, supra note 8, at 223 (“In 
many ways, indeed, the rule of law register might be thought of as standing in for the old 
language of ‘civilisation’—the mark of accomplishment of the modern; something we have 
but they do not; that we must help them achieve; and whose presence or absence is itself the 
determinant and mobilising criterion for a body of other interventions.”); ABA Mission & 
Goals, A.B.A., www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba/aba-mission-goals.html (last visited 
Apr. 26, 2014) (noting that “advanc[ing]” the rule of law in the United States consists of 
promoting “respect” of our existing system). 
 17. See Upham, supra note 7, at 18 (noting that for decades the United States has spent 
one-ninth the amount per capita as England on civil legal services for low-income people). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See White, supra note 1, at 144 (defining “legal literacy” as “that degree of 
competence in legal discourse required for meaningful and active life in our increasingly 
legalistic and litigious culture”). 
 20. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932) (“Even the intelligent and 
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.”), quoted in Gideon 
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963). 
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common law as instruments of governance.”21  It is possible that our efforts 
to export our legal system or our system itself may have fundamental flaws 
that the legal empowerment alternative does not address.22  The model that 
the United States seeks to export has proven, at home and abroad, to 
concentrate power in the hands of those with the money and power to 
access judicial systems.  But because this model is so much more 
entrenched and stable in the United States than in the countries to which we 
seek to export it, the empowerment of nonlawyers within our existing 
system is imperative.  Marginally increasing access to legal services will 
not do this—the legal profession must empower laypeople for greater 
engagement with the law themselves. 
II.  DISPELLING THE LAWYER’S MYSTIQUE TO EMPOWER THE LAY PUBLIC 
This Part discusses public misperceptions of lawyers that impede 
understanding of how the law works.  Part II.A discusses the misperception 
of lawyers as special by virtue of being generalists with broad knowledge of 
all areas of law, rather than people with a particular way of thinking and 
working.  Part II.B argues that if laypeople do not understand some 
peculiarities of “thinking like a lawyer,” the law can seem arbitrary and 
corrupt, and attempts at reforming it can seem futile. 
A.  Lawyers Are Not General Experts 
The education, exclusivity, and monopoly power of the U.S. legal 
profession has led to a common perception that lawyers are special.  
Lawyers may be special, but not for the reasons that the profession and the 
media commonly present to the public.  In particular, given the 
complexities of the law, most lawyers are not generalists competent to 
answer any question at hand, but specialists in the law of particular 
disciplines and jurisdictions.23  But the layperson that asks the lawyer at the 
cocktail party a tax question may think of lawyers as more generally 
knowledgeable than we are.  The lawyer of the public imagination has the 
answer whatever the issue or jurisdiction.  He doesn’t answer, “That’s not 
my area.  You need a tax attorney.” 
 
 21. Robert W. Gordon, The Role of Lawyers in Producing the Rule of Law:  Some 
Critical Reflections, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 441, 465 (2010). 
 22. See HUMPHREYS, supra note 8, at 211–13 (arguing that the United Nations’ 
conception of “legal empowerment,” which differs from Golub’s, is not a meaningful 
divergence from the rule of law project); see also Upham, supra note 7, at 99 (concluding 
that neither the U.S. nor Japanese legal systems are likely useful models for other societies 
and arguing that the formal systems adherents to the rule of law orthodoxy seek to create 
may not be worthwhile in light of the benefits of informal systems such as Japan’s). 
 23. A Florida criminal attorney provided an example of media’s tendency to treat 
lawyers as generalists in a blog expressing frustration with the coverage of the trial of 
George Zimmerman, which regularly featured lawyers who did not practice in Florida and 
lacked criminal experience. See Brian Tannebaum, The Embarrassment of the George 
Zimmerman Verdict, CRIM. DEF. BLOG (July 14, 2013, 8:43 AM), http://criminaldefenseblog.
blogspot.com/2013/07/the-embarrassment-of-george-zimmerman.html. 
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This does not mean that laypeople should stop asking intellectual 
property attorneys criminal procedure questions.  Ideally, lawyers should 
have a broad, even if necessarily shallow, knowledge of the law.  Any 
justification for the lawyers’ monopoly and the costly education required to 
join the profession must rest in part on that presumption.  But the lay public 
needs to understand that U.S. law is extremely complicated, even to 
lawyers, and varies among jurisdictions.  Lawyers, in turn, who may be 
susceptible to “overconfidence bias,”24 should not further misunderstanding 
of the legal system by presenting themselves as general experts, though the 
notion is encouraged by unauthorized practice of law rules.25  Furthering 
the idea that lawyers have an exclusive ability to understand any law risks 
discouraging laypeople from learning about particular legal issues that are 
relevant to their lives or policy preferences. 
Lawyers are special not because they have a database of laws in their 
heads making them experts on whatever legal topic might arise, nor by 
virtue of an exclusive ability for legal analysis,26 but because they embrace 
certain counterintuitive processes and principles that can seem strange or 
 
 24. Leslie C. Levin, The Monopoly Myth and Other Tales About the Superiority of 
Lawyers, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2611, 2627 (2014). 
 25. The effect of unauthorized practice of law rules on access to justice, and the 
purported justification for such rules is discussed elsewhere in this Colloquium.  One related 
set of examples that are perhaps minor in comparison but illustrative of the problem of the 
“specialness” of lawyers are certain pro bono efforts I have been involved in that entail 
minimal training but are open only to lawyers or law students, such as monitoring elections, 
which required only a few hours of training and did not entail giving legal advice.  
Additionally, I represented a woman seeking an order of protection in my first weeks of law 
school, but a social worker with years of experience in domestic violence generally may not.  
New York’s Family Court Act permits unrepresented petitioners to have a “non-witness 
friend, relative, counselor or social worker present in the court room” but that individual is 
not authorized to take part in the proceedings. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 838 (McKinney 2009).  I  
was participating in Sanctuary for Families’ Courtroom Advocates Program, which has 
special agreements with some courts allowing law students to represent petitioners seeking 
orders of protection. 
  In the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, the New York Legal Assistance Group 
provided webinars and manuals to lawyers who manned makeshift legal clinics offering 
information about insurance claims, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
assistance, and other relief. See Nicole Wallace, A Nonprofit Pushes To Make Legal Aid Key 
Part of Disaster Services, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Oct. 29, 2013), https://philanthropy.com/
article/A-Nonprofit-Pushes-to-Make/142681/; see also N.Y. LEGAL ASSISTANCE GRP., 
SUPERSTORM SANDY 1 YEAR REPORT, available at http://nylag.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/
11/Superstorm-Sandy-1-Year-Report-Summary.pdf.  This information might have been 
especially useful in the hands of the nonlawyer volunteers who went into homes to provide 
food and debris removal.  One “Occupy Sandy” volunteer told me he needed information 
about how to handle problems encountered, sometimes in the homes of homebound 
individuals, like power and elevator service that had not been restored, or how to access 
emergency aid.  Equipping those volunteers with New York Legal Assistance Group’s 
training would likely be foreclosed by concerns about unauthorized practice and assumptions 
about the capabilities of nonlawyers. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2013). 
 26. See Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Law on the Street:  Legal Narrative and the Street Law 
Classroom, 9 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 285, 322 (2008) (challenging the view of lawyers as 
experts with special legal analysis abilities that devalue the problem-solving abilities of 
clients). 
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heartless to the uninitiated.27 The idea of the lawyer as a member of a 
profession apart serves the monopoly, but it undermines the functioning of 
a participatory democracy in which nonlawyers are charged with obeying 
the law, shaping it through the political process, and applying it as jurors.  
For this reason, civic participants need to understand what lawyers do and 
be able to think like a lawyer to some extent themselves. 
B.  “Thinking Like a Lawyer” 
That the goal of a legal education is to learn to think like a lawyer is a 
law school truism.28  What it means or should mean to think like a lawyer, 
and whether teaching law students to do so is a good idea, is the subject of 
some debate.29  The term may be a “cliché among law teachers” or “ritual 
cant,”30 but it does capture the experience of law students who see 
themselves as having struggled to master a new way of thinking to succeed 
in law school that their nonlawyer friends find alien. 
I use the term not to enter into the debate as to how a lawyer should think 
and what constitutes good legal reasoning, but to describe some common 
elements captured by the law school cliché.  Thinking like a lawyer entails 
the ability to separate one’s assumptions, and moral intuitions from the 
legal question at hand; attention to detail; an acceptance of counsel’s role in 
the adversarial system; and a sense that even seemingly plain legal language 
is filled with terms of art.31 
One professor illustrated the concept in a story recounted by a student.  
“Professor Lawson” would tell his students to imagine themselves in a bar a 
year prior to law school talking about a legal issue over drinks.32  Students 
would admit they would have thought a particular behavior was illegal back 
then, based on their sense of right and wrong, to which he would exclaim: 
Well, boys and girls, that’s not true.  It is legal.  They don’t know over 
there at the bar what is and isn’t legal.  And neither did you, before you 
 
 27. See Leonard E. Gross, The Public Hates Lawyers:  Why Should We Care?, 29 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1405, 1421 (1999) (stating that members of the public may see lawyers as 
“engaged in some sort of deceitful or unethical practice when, in reality, lawyers are merely 
fulfilling their role in the adversary system”). 
 28. James R. Elkins, Thinking Like a Lawyer:  Second Thoughts, 47 MERCER L. REV. 
511, 512 (1996) (describing the phrase as “sufficiently common to have become a cliché 
among law teachers”); Sanford Levinson, Taking Law Seriously:  Reflections on “Thinking 
Like a Lawyer,” 30 STAN. L. REV. 1071, 1071 (reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY (1977)) (“It is probable that everyone who has gone to law school has been 
told—often by the Dean in a welcoming address—that the purpose of the enterprise of a 
legal education is to learn to ‘think like a lawyer.’”). 
 29. See Elkins, supra note 28, at 515–17 (describing conflicting normative conceptions 
of what it means to “think like a lawyer”); see also MacDowell, supra note 26, at 317–25 
(arguing that legal education thwarts development of the consciousness and skills a lawyer 
needs to work for social change); Levinson, supra note 28, at 1071 (questioning the two 
propositions that the term implies:  “(1) that there is a particular way lawyers think; and (2) 
that this particular way is also a desirable way”). 
 30. Elkins, supra note 28, at 512, 515; see also Levinson, supra note 28, at 1071 
(arguing that “thinking like a lawyer” should not be dismissed as “ritual cant”). 
 31. See generally White, supra note 1 (discussing the “invisible discourse of the law”). 
 32. Elkins, supra note 28, at 517–18. 
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came here.  That’s why you came to law school.  Those people who think 
something is legal or illegal because it’s right or wrong don’t know what 
they’re talking about.  They’re practicing “bar stool law.”  Law school is 
where you learn what the law is.  This is where you find out what is and 
isn’t legal—what you can and can’t do.  What the law really is.33 
Professor Lawson railing against “bar stool law” may be a caricature of the 
arrogant and amoral lawyer, but he identifies two important truths.34  The 
first is that the law can be counterintuitive or unjust, but lawyers must 
distinguish between what the law is and what they think it should be. The 
second is that significant barriers prevent “bar stool pundits,” i.e., civic 
participants and subjects of the law, from understanding the laws that 
govern their lives.35 
That a lawyer must be able to separate the law from her feelings about it 
does not mean her work ends with a determination of what the law says 
about a particular set of facts.  The legalistic inquiry need only be a first 
step that precedes the broader work of considering the best options and 
arguments in light of what the law says, identifying inadequacies in the law, 
arguing for its reform, or identifying nonlegal approaches to a problem. 
To the layperson, however, the insistence on clarity as to what the law 
does and does not say can look like an endorsement of the answer.  For 
instance, at a panel concerning a report on the Obama Administration’s 
drone program, an attorney who coauthored the report and openly and 
actively opposes the program explained that, as a lawyer, she could not say 
that the program was illegal.36  Activists in attendance met this admission 
with derision, perhaps because they could not imagine how such a thing 
could be legal given their deep conviction that it was wrong, or because 
they took her refusal to call the program illegal as wavering in her moral 
condemnation of it. 
Lawyers tend to respect the rule of law even in the case of bad laws that 
may seem illegitimate to the layperson.37  They treat the law as a binding 
contract that can be renegotiated but remains in force no matter how flawed, 
while the layperson has less reason to suspend his disbelief as to his having 
consented to the terms.  Many lawyers may be guilty of pretending that the 
law is itself objective rather than a construct reflecting our society’s biases 
and power imbalances,38 but it remains necessary to strive for objectivity 
and accuracy in determining what the law is in order to critique it. 
 
 33. Id. at 517. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Id. at 518. 
 36. Documenting Obama’s Wars:  A Roundtable Discussion, CTR. CONST. RTS., 
http://www.ccrjustice.org/get-involved/calendar/documenting-obamas-wars-roundtable (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 37. See MacDowell, supra note 26, at 332–33 (“[T]he paradox of lawyering for social 
change requires positioning oneself both inside and outside the law.”). 
 38. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 162 
(1989) (“Objectivity is liberal legalism’s conception of itself.  It legitimates itself by 
reflecting its view of society, a society it helps make by so seeing it, and calling that view, 
and that relation, rationality.  Since rationality is measured by point-of-viewlessness, what 
counts as reason is that which corresponds to the way things are.”). 
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The attention to detail and concern with procedure involved in thinking 
like a lawyer can look to the layperson like an elevation of form over 
substance or an attempt to sanitize or rationalize injustice.  Many lawyers 
have a principled commitment to their role in a flawed system or actively 
work for reform.  The uninitiated, however, may see the lawyer explaining 
the intricacies of the law as uninterested in systemic injustice.39 
Understanding how the common law adversarial system works is 
necessary to believe we have something approaching the rule of law in the 
United States, rather than a system in which judges decide whatever they 
want by virtue of their power.  The common law system has inherent 
obstacles to the layperson’s view of the law as predictable, because, 
counterintuitively for some laypeople, one cannot just read what a statute or 
the Constitution says but must know the precedent that controls its 
interpretation.  The professional conservatism of Anglo-American lawyers 
has been attributed to their attachment to the past through precedent,40 but 
this same precedent can make the law seem arbitrary and unpredictable to 
the layperson.41 
 
 39. This became evident to me as a result of readers’ reactions to pieces I have published 
online in which I aimed to explain to a lay audience the law relevant to a number of viral 
media stories. See, e.g., Commentista, Comment to Bridgette Dunlap, No, Texas Law Does 
Not Say You Can Shoot an Escort Who Refuses To Have Sex, RH REALITY CHECK (June 8, 
2013, 12:27 PM), rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/06/08/no-texas-law-does-not-say-you-can-
shoot-an-escort-who-refuses-to-have-sex/ [hereinafter Dunlap, Texas Law] (“This entire 
hand-wring article is unbelievably boring and pedantic.  Imagine, a ‘legal analyst’ (aka 
lawyer)—a profession that prides itself on character assassination and lying for money—
scolding journalists because they didn’t wallow in the same obscure legal minutae that law-
liars grow fat on.  The judge, the jury, and the legal defense team, deserve all the denigration 
that can be heaped upon them.”); QuickStriker, Comment to Bridgette Dunlap, What the 
Blogosphere Got Dangerously Wrong About the Renisha McBride Case, RH REALITY 
CHECK (Nov. 19 2013, 10:47 AM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/11/19/what-the-
blogosphere-got-dangerously-wrong-about-the-renisha-mcbride-case/ [hereinafter Dunlap, 
What the Blogosphere Got Dangerously Wrong] (“You’re making statements about the letter 
of the law, but the letter doesn’t matter.  What matters is how the public views it . . . .”); 
Rebecca Binns, Comment to Bridgette Dunlap, How Anonymous Does More Harm Than 
Good for Sexual Assault Victims, RH REALITY CHECK (Feb. 10, 2014, 5:54 PM), 
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/02/10/anonymous-harm-good-sexual-assault-victims/ 
[hereinafter Dunlap, Anonymous] (“Yes, innocent until proven guilty is important.  Yes, 
information accuracy is important.  But pointing that out shouldn’t also come at the expense 
of furthering rape culture yourselves, and rape really isn’t that hard to prove.  We need to 
listen to survivors instead of blame and disbelieve them by default. What this article is is 
pussyfooting.  Pure and simple.”); see also colleen2, Comment to Dunlap, Anonymous, 
supra (“If you don’t have a problem with the way the current system treats rape and rape 
victims I can fully understand why you appear to believe that the real damage was caused by 
speaking the truth.”). 
 40. Gordon, supra note 21, at 450.  (“Anglo-American lawyers in particular are 
professionally conservative because [they are] attached to the past through common law 
method, with its respect for precedent.  Lawyers promote institutions and procedures that 
will use their skills, services and reasoning modes:  judicial review of legislative and 
administrative action, trial-type procedures for determining facts, and the like.”). 
 41. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, A Jurisprudential Approach to Common Law Legal 
Analysis, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 269, 271–72 (1999) (describing some laypeople’s view of the 
law as uncertain and legal outcomes as thus determined by the personal views and biases of 
judges). 
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Another strange aspect of thinking like a lawyer is the commitment to the 
adversarial process over the search for objective truth.42  Few Americans, 
including lawyers, are familiar with civil law systems, but the inquisitional 
approach in which even the accused is obliged to share what she knows is, 
perhaps, more intuitive, given that in many contexts one is expected to 
account for one’s actions and explain inconsistencies in one’s story.43  
Ignorance of the reasons for the right against self-incrimination and its 
centrality, for better or worse,44 creates an obstacle to laypeople’s 
willingness to buy in to the system that has built up around it.  The fiction 
that the truth will emerge from two adversaries telling opposite stories and 
doing their best to keep information that is true but damaging out of court is 
central to our legal system,45 but the lawyer’s work to build a competing 
narrative regardless of her client’s factual guilt can look like lying to the 
layperson.  Distaste for the legal profession certainly results from some 
actual bad acts of lawyers, but it would also seem to result from incomplete 
understanding of the lawyer’s role in the only judicial system we have.46 
The concept of zealous representation is not as intuitive as a lawyer 
might think.  Laypeople must be educated about the fact that American 
lawyers have ethical obligations to prioritize the interests of their clients 
over the truth, the public interest, and justice.47  This is not to say lawyers 
must be “hired guns” barred from considering the public interest at all, or 
that they should not give more consideration to the greater good.48  It is 
only to say that the public needs to have a general understanding of the 
lawyer’s obligations when representing an individual client and the 
justifications for them, even if those justifications are contested. 
 
 42. See generally Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth:  An Umpireal View, 123 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975) (proposing reforms that might alter the balance between lawyers’ 
ethical obligations to the client and the search for truth). 
 43. See Bron McKillop, Anatomy of a French Murder Case, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 527, 
576 (1997) (noting the expectation that an accused in the French system has an obligation 
“to contribute information within his knowledge to the common endeavor of establishing the 
truth”); see also Frankel, supra note 42, at 1053 (“Our commitment to the adversary or 
“accusatorial” mode is buttressed by a corollary certainty that other, alien systems are 
inferior.  We contrast our form of criminal procedure with the “inquisitorial” system, 
conjuring up visions of torture, secrecy, and dictatorial government.  Confident of our 
superiority, we do not bother to find out how others work.”). 
 44. Frankel, supra note 42, at 1053 (“It is permissible to keep asking, because nobody 
has satisfactorily answered, why our present system of confessions in the police station 
versus no confessions at all is better than an open and orderly procedure of having a judicial 
official question suspects.”). 
 45. See Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankel’s Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 
1060, 1066 (1975) (responding to Frankel, supra note 42, and arguing our commitment to 
fundamental values protected by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments “precludes a 
single-minded search for truth”). 
 46. See Gross, supra note 27, at 1406 (suggesting misunderstanding of their role in the 
adversarial system has more to do with lawyers’ bad image than unethical practices). 
 47. See Frankel, supra note 42, at 1057–59. 
 48. Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, The Obligation of Lawyers To Heal Civic Culture:  
Confronting the Ordeal of Incivility in the Practice of Law, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 
1, 4 (2011). 
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The person equipped to think like a lawyer forces herself to look at the 
law in the light most favorable to her opponent.  She must accept that 
factually guilty people go free as a result of rules put in place to check 
government power and minimize the risk of innocent people being found 
guilty.  She must think of how a law might affect someone unlike herself. 
When the commentator or legislator thinks like a lawyer, she considers 
the merits of a law based on how it will actually affect people, the way a 
lawyer considers the application of the law to her client.  This, however, is 
not what the public typically encounters.  Too often, commentators and 
politicians, even those trained as lawyers, argue for or against laws on the 
basis of generalizations or make claims about the effect of court decisions 
they know to be inaccurate.49  This makes it especially important for 
laypeople to have basic legal reasoning skills and knowledge so they can 
critically assess the arguments of their representatives. 
The bar stool pundit unfamiliar with thinking like a lawyer may be 
inclined to write off an unsatisfactory legal outcome as the product of a 
racist jury or corrupt legal system.50  Unlawyerly judgments about the 
reasons for a verdict or a law have the potential to obscure the specific 
problems underlying injustice or make working to address those problems 
seem futile.51  The legal profession needs to empower the bar stool pundits 
to spot legal questions and learn more, so they can demand their rights, seek 
counsel, or advocate and vote for reforms rather than seeing the law as 
hopelessly corrupt. 
 
 49. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Lawyers, Democracy and Dispute Resolution:  The 
Declining Influence of Lawyer-Statesmen Politicians and Lawyerly Values, 5 NEV. L.J. 479, 
488–98 (2005) (describing “the tendency of lawyer-politicians to leave behind lawyerly 
values in favor of the poorer quality values of politics”); see, e.g., Rick Ungar, Ted Cruz and 
the Doctrine of Pretend Paranoia, FORBES (July 24, 2013, 10:18 AM), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/rickungar/2013/07/24/ted-cruz-and-the-doctrine-of-pretend-paranoia/ (reporting 
that Senator Ted Cruz warned that the legalization of gay marriage could lead to pastors who 
refuse to perform marriage ceremonies or preach against homosexuality facing prosecution 
for hate speech despite the fact that Cruz is a former U.S. Supreme Court litigator familiar 
with the First Amendment who knows this is not the case). See generally Nancy B. 
Rapoport, Presidential Ethics:  Should a Law Degree Make a Difference?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 725, 730 (2001) (arguing that lawyer-politicians should follow the ethics rules even 
when they are not representing clients). 
 50. See, e.g., Dunlap, Texas Law, supra note 39 (disputing a viral media narrative 
attributing the acquittal of a man who shot a fleeing woman to either Texas’s defense of 
property law or a biased jury). 
 51. See, e.g., Dunlap, What the Blogosphere Got Dangerously Wrong, supra note 39 
(arguing misrepresentation of “Stand Your Ground” laws has the dangerous effect of making 
people believe they have a greater right to use force than those laws actually provide and that 
the rush to vilify individual prosecutors obscures systemic problems); see also Dunlap, 
Anonymous, supra note 39 (arguing that the cyber-activist collective Anonymous’s 
misrepresentation of and interference with rape prosecutions undermines legal protections 
and reform efforts). 
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III.  THE LIMITS OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL:   
LEGAL ILLITERACY AND LAWLESSNESS 
This Part argues that public ignorance of basic legal principles risks a 
functional lawlessness that greater access to counsel will not address.  Part 
III.A discusses the American Bar Association’s (ABA) conflicting interests 
in serving lawyers and improving access to justice.  Part III.B examines the 
ABA’s public education work and argues that efforts aimed at mandating 
civics education do too little to address the fundamental problem of the 
typical layperson’s ignorance of her protections and obligations under the 
law.  Part III.C illustrates this by examining examples of public ignorance 
of the tort and crime of battery, and Part III.D focuses on the recent rash of 
young people taking and distributing photographs of sexual batteries they 
do not recognize as crimes or torts. 
A.  The American Bar Association’s Approach to Access to Justice 
Though legal professions extol the equal application of the law and its 
availability to all, they generally do too little “to secure practical access to 
justice.”52  The ABA prides itself on its commitment to access to justice 
and advocates for legal aid funding and pro bono legal assistance but has 
not made widespread access to legal services a reality.53  There is reason to 
doubt that the ABA’s latest effort, discussed below, will have a meaningful 
impact on access to counsel.  Regardless, more low-cost legal services 
would be insufficient to enfranchise members of a lay public whose 
knowledge of their rights and responsibilities is so lacking that they may 
not know to seek counsel.  The focus on lawyer-provided services as the 
solution risks perpetuating this knowledge problem. 
In an October 2013 article, ABA President James R. Silkenat wrote, “Our 
nation is facing a paradox involving access to justice.”54  He went on to 
explain that too many people cannot afford lawyers no matter how urgent 
the issue, while “too many law graduates in recent years have found it 
difficult to gain the practical experience they need to enter practice 
effectively.”55  Silkenat explains that the American Bar Association is 
“uniquely positioned to connect the unmet legal needs of our society and 
the unmet employment needs of our young lawyers.”56  Unfortunately, 
 
 52. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 451. 
 53. James R. Silkenat, Connecting Supply and Demand:  Legal Access Job Corps Will 
Place Law Grads in Areas with Unmet Legal Needs, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2013, at 8. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  It is debatable whether the problem is properly framed as one of graduates 
lacking practical experience given the traditional use of an apprenticeship model.  Arguably, 
the problem is actually a shortage of employers willing to train young attorneys given the 
availability of more experienced attorneys due to the contraction in the legal market, 
technologies and other service models replacing some lawyer services, an increased number 
of law graduates, and the chronic underfunding of legal services that makes even low-paying 
jobs providing services to the poor competitive.  But what is indeed a “paradox” is that a 
country with as many lawyers as we have has such a severe access to justice problem. See 
generally Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1786 (2001). 
 56. Silkenat, supra note 53, at 8. 
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these interests may conflict.  The loss of legal jobs may exacerbate the 
already protectionist impulses of the American legal profession, which has 
a monopoly that extends to services that lawyers are not providing.  
Training paralegals to provide services has been a particularly effective 
legal empowerment strategy abroad, but it is generally foreclosed by 
unauthorized practice rules in the United States.57  Lawyers might train 
laypeople in other fields, such as social work, to, for example, provide 
representation in eviction proceedings or to obtain orders of protection.58  
We might prefer that these services be provided by lawyers.  But short of 
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services59 being overturned or a massive 
new commitment to public funding of civil legal services—a kind of public 
works project for lawyers that would solve the access to justice problem 
and the employment problem all at once—the bar’s best efforts to address 
unmet legal needs with more lawyer-provided services are almost certain to 
fall short.60 
The ABA has convened a Legal Access Jobs Corps Task Force to 
identify ways to address the access to justice “paradox” by increasing 
opportunities for new lawyers to serve the poor.61  Examples of such 
initiatives seem promising and worthwhile, but ultimately all appear to 
come down to new funding models for lawyer services.  However, funding 
on the scale that would be necessary to comport with the rule of law ideal 
that we promote around the globe appears impossible in the near term given 
the widespread hostility to government in the United States and the lack of 
consensus about our obligations to create conditions for equality.62 
 
 57. See Golub, supra note 2, at 171–73.  Permitting knowledgeable laypeople to appear 
in administrative proceedings has been successful in the United States. Erin B. Corcoran, 
Bypassing Civil Gideon:  A Legislative Proposal To Address the Rising Costs and Unmet 
Legal Needs of Unrepresented Immigrants, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 643, 667 (2012) 
(highlighting the examples of Social Security Administration disability appeals, the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office, and the U.S. Department of Justice’s Legal Orientation 
Program). 
 58. See Suzanne J. Schmitz, What’s the Harm?:  Rethinking the Role of Domestic 
Violence Advocates and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
295, 317 (2004) (arguing that the bench and bar have not met the needs of domestic violence 
victims and should support lay advocates’ ability to do so).  Landlords are much more likely 
than tenants to have representation in housing court, and tenants have a dramatically 
increased likelihood of success if represented. Matthew Desmond, Tipping the Scales in 
Housing Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov., 13, 2012, at A35 (describing unpublished research).  The 
New York Senate has a bill, pending in the Judiciary Committee, that would allow tenants to 
be represented by nonlawyers in eviction proceedings, but those nonlawyers must not be 
paid. See S. 427, 2013–2014 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013). 
 59. 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (holding that there is a “presumption that an indigent litigant has 
a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical 
liberty” in a case concerning an unrepresented, indigent woman who lost her parental rights). 
 60. See id. at 26–27. 
 61. Silkenat, supra note 53, at 8. 
 62. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum & Robert Gebeloff, Even Critics of Safety Net 
Increasingly Depend on It, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at A1 (“Many people say they are 
angry because the government is wasting money and giving money to people who do not 
deserve it.  But more than that, they say they want to reduce the role of government in their 
own lives.  They are frustrated that they need help, feel guilty for taking it and resent the 
government for providing it.  They say they want less help for themselves; less help in caring 
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The access to justice initiatives cited by Mr. Silkenat, such as a 
postgraduate Legal Access Jobs Corps and law school–based clinics that 
would serve indigent populations, are consistent with a continued 
dependence on lawyers.  Putting more of the bar’s indebted and 
unemployed new members to work fulfilling unmet legal needs is an 
excellent idea, but the emphasis on new attorneys getting experience to 
make them more competitive raises the concern that the interests of lawyers 
will take priority over those without access to justice.63  Indeed, of the four 
goals the ABA outlines for the achievement of its mission, the first is to 
serve the members of the ABA, and the last is to advance the rule of law 
and ensure “meaningful access to justice for all persons.”64 
If the Job Corps is a low-paying stepping stone to more lucrative work, it 
will risk making serving the poor seem like a temporary, charitable 
endeavor for novices who need more training for “real” legal work, rather 
than an obligation society must meet in order to establish the rule of law.  
The Job Corps could marginally increase access to services while fortifying 
the idea that only lawyers can serve our vast unmet legal needs or 
understand the law, which is at the heart of the access to justice problem. 
A true commitment to legal empowerment on the part of lawyers would 
necessarily entail some efforts to make ourselves less needed, less special, 
and less wealthy.  But it might also create new opportunities if we expanded 
the conception of the role of a lawyer.  If we accept that the bar will never 
be able to provide enough pro bono and low-cost, individual representation 
to give everyone equal access to justice—given the ubiquity and complexity 
of the law in the United States—we can think honestly and strategically 
about what the American bar’s role should be in promoting the rule of law 
domestically.65  This might involve educating laypeople and empowering 
them to address their own legal needs and those of people in their 
 
for relatives; less assistance when they reach old age.”); Richard A. Epstein, In Praise of 
Income Inequality, DEFINING IDEAS (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.hoover.org/publications/
defining-ideas/article/140746; Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive:  Originalism As Popular 
Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 228 (2008) (describing hostility towards 
the government as a theme in the 1994 election and pronounced in the National Rifle 
Association). 
 63. Cf. Elizabeth Chambliss, It’s Not About Us:  Beyond the Job Market Critique of U.S. 
Law Schools, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423 (2013) (arguing that the conversation about legal 
education should focus on the interests of consumers and clients, rather than law students 
and lawyers). 
 64. ABA Mission and Goals, supra note 16. 
 65. Benjamin Barton predicts in this Colloquium that the letter of lawyer regulation will 
not change anytime soon, but technologies and workarounds will lead to a practical change 
in who can practice law.  The weakening of the lawyer monopoly out of court will benefit 
consumers, who will enjoy lower cost services.  The monopoly will endure, however, in the 
courtroom. See Benjamin H. Barton, The Lawyer’s Monopoly—What Goes and What Stays, 
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3067, 3079–80 (2014).  If Barton is correct, legal services will become 
more accessible for everyone but those who need them most:  people who cannot afford 
representation in eviction proceedings, creditor lawsuits, parental rights determinations, and 
the like. 
2014] ANYONE CAN “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” 2831 
communities in ways currently forbidden by unauthorized practice of law 
rules.66 
B.  The Limits of Civics 
The ABA has a number of initiatives aimed at public education on the 
law, primarily focused on information for consumers of lawyer-provided 
services and advocacy for civics education.  Civics education is undeniably 
vital to a functioning democracy and is lacking in the United States.67  The 
ABA’s advocacy is an important effort to keep it in the public school 
curriculum given No Child Left Behind’s emphasis on tested subjects like 
math and reading.68  Yet the vision of civics and law education, most 
prominently promoted by the ABA through both advocacy for mandatory 
civics standards and youth summits, seems incomplete in its lack of focus 
on practical legal knowledge and legal reasoning skills. 
The ABA’s conception of what the citizenry most needs to know aligns 
well with the continued primacy of lawyers.  Its civics education efforts 
focus heavily on “respect” for the rule of law, which ostensibly already 
exists in the United States.  Specifically, this entails respect for the 
separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary.  The former 
 
 66. New York is piloting a program in which nonlawyer “navigators” supervised by 
three nonprofit organizations assist unrepresented litigants.  However, the navigators are 
prohibited from giving legal advice and may address the court only if questioned by a judge. 
Administrative Order of the Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts, No. AO/42/14 
(Feb. 10, 2014), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/COURTS/nyc/SSI/pdfs/AO-42-14.pdf 
(relating to the Court Navigator Program).  Predictably, the state bar association expressed 
concern, and proponents had to assure lawyers that the navigators would not hurt their 
economic interests because they will assist people too poor to pay an attorney. See Joel 
Stashenko, State Bar Seeks Assurances on ‘Navigator’ Plan, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 5, 2014, at 1, 1 
(“[State bar president David] Schraver said lawyers are concerned about the breadth of the 
navigator’s role. ‘The concern is that the navigator not cross the line into practicing law,’ he 
said.”).  The New York Times editorial board praised the plan and told lawyers not to feel 
threatened. Editorial, Better Lawyering for the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2014, at A26.  It 
failed to note that the navigators are, in fact, prohibited from doing any “lawyering for the 
poor.” 
 67. See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON CIVIC EDUC. IN THE NATION’S SCH., RESOLUTION 1–
2 (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/public_
education/2011augustabapolicyresolutionandreportmandateciviced0080911.pdf. 
 68. While the ABA is right to criticize the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. 
No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified at scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.), it is unclear to 
what, if any, extent it is to blame for the public’s lack of civic knowledge, especially given 
that earlier generations of Americans also had little civics knowledge, as was recognized in 
an article about the ABA’s efforts in the ABA Journal. See Marc Hansen, Flunking Civics:  
Why America’s Kids Know So Little, A.B.A. J., May 2011, at 32, 35 (“While it’s true that 
most young Americans don’t know all that much about politics and government, they know 
as much as their parents did and more than their peers in other countries, says Peter Levine, 
director of the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement, and 
one of the leading researchers in the field . . . .  Levine says that schools are still teaching 
civics as much as or more than ever before.  The amount of time devoted to social studies in 
elementary and middle school has remained pretty constant over the years, he says, and the 
amount of time devoted to social studies in high school is up substantially, although the mix 
of courses has changed appreciably since the 1950s.  Civics and problem- or discussion- 
oriented classes are less common today than they were in the 1950s, he says, but political 
science, economics and social studies classes are more common.”). 
2832 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
name of the ABA’s civic education commission, the Commission on Civic 
Education and the Separation of Powers,69 highlights this emphasis on 
protecting the role of the courts, as does that of a recent event entitled “Law 
Day:  No Courts, No Justice, No Freedom.”70  This emphasis, motivated by 
attacks on the judiciary,71 is in keeping with a history of bar associations’ 
proclivity to join in resistance to authoritarianism only once their autonomy 
is threatened.72  It is also in keeping with the emphasis of ABA rule of law 
promoters abroad on promoting the prestige of judiciaries.73 
An alternative approach would place greater emphasis on knowing one’s 
rights and obligations, but lawyers can be unfriendly to the spread of 
general rights consciousness that would permit legal remedies against the 
powerful clienteles on which they depend.74  Less ominously, lawyers may 
see themselves as having an exclusive role in mediating those rights based 
on their special knowledge or skill.  This leaves the subjects of the law 
without an adequate knowledge of it, which undermines the rule of law in 
even its most formalist sense of a set of predictable rules, uniformly 
applied.  A basic civics education is imperative for a citizen to be able to 
shape the law through participation in the democratic process.75  But an 
 
 69. Michael S. Greco, Lawyers Have a Lot To Teach:  Take on the Education of Your 
Fellow Citizens To Protect the Rights We Have Through Courts, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2005, at 6. 
 70. AM. BAR ASS’N, LAW DAY 2012 (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/images/public_education/law_day_2012_planning_guide2.pdf. 
 71. See American Bar Association Commission on Civic Education and the Separation 
of Powers, A.B.A., http://apps.americanbar.org/op/greco/civic_ed.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 
2014) (“Current tensions among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches have 
brought to the fore the basic principles of separation of powers that have supported and 
sustained our republic for more than 200 years.  Recent attempts to intimidate judges, cut 
court budgets, and dramatically alter the jurisdiction and other fundamental characteristics of 
courts have raised serious concerns about unhealthy and unwarranted infringements on the 
separation of powers, and their effect on public perception of the judiciary and public 
understanding of the importance of separation of powers.”). 
 72. Gordon, supra note 21, at 457 (“Bar associations—not generally the most 
courageous or liberal-minded of institutions—have been most likely to join in resistance to 
authoritarian rule where they had some traditions of autonomy they were motivated to 
defend.”). 
 73. HUMPHREYS, supra note 8, at 198 (“[I]f law is to rule, its priests and guardians must 
be tended.  An important background theme in rule of law projects has been to increase the 
prestige of the judiciary. . . .  Funding judicial associations and supporting regular 
conferences on themes such as the role of judges in society, or the importance of the rule of 
law, are all intended to address these shortcomings, to nurture professional pride, and to 
sensitize the courts to their public role . . . .  [T]his will lead to greater ‘societal respect’ (the 
term used in one USAID document for ‘legitimacy’), which will in turn boost their capacity 
to apply the law independently.” (citations omitted)). 
 74. Gordon, supra note 21, at 451 (noting the efforts of U.S. bar associations to 
undermine personal injury bars with ethics rules prohibiting solicitation and contingency 
fees, tort reform efforts, and unauthorized practice prosecutions even in markets that lawyers 
do not serve). 
 75. Ilya Somin argues that intractably low levels of voter knowledge are not due to poor 
access to political information or low levels of education but are the result of “rational 
ignorance,” because voters have little incentive to acquire political information given the 
insignificance of any one vote to electoral outcomes. Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty:  A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of 
Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1293–94 (2004). 
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understanding of governmental institutions and the separation of powers is 
not enough to provide a threshold awareness of the content of the law that 
governs daily life. 
In a 2011 paper on legal knowledge in the United States, the ABA 
Commission on Civic Education lamented the fact that more Americans 
could name a judge on American Idol than name the Chief Justice of the 
U.S. Supreme Court.76  While this may be demoralizing to denizens of the 
judicial branch, it seems unlikely to either indicate or cause an impediment 
to a person’s participation in American democracy or awareness of her 
rights.  It is perhaps even a sign that our courts are less personality driven 
than the political branches.  Regardless, not being able to name Chief 
Justice John Roberts is, in my view, not nearly as big a problem as not 
knowing, for example, what a tort is. 
C.  Ignorance of Legal Basics:  The Example of Battery 
Americans need to know that they are bound by the criminal and civil 
law in order to understand that they can be held responsible for harming 
someone, even by accident.  They need to know what their rights are in 
order to seek recourse when they are violated.  They need to know what a 
tort is in order to pursue civil remedies when the criminal justice system 
fails them or isn’t the appropriate forum. 
The average citizen does not need to know all the elements of the prima 
facie case for common law battery, for example, but she does need to get 
the gist:  that intentionally touching someone without permission is 
generally a tort and often a crime.77  It might seem obvious to a lawyer, but 
the normalization of violence, as well as the treatment of women’s bodies 
as public in our society, can obscure the fact that it is not just mean or rude 
to touch without consent but illegal.  If we taught citizens from a young age 
that starting a fistfight or groping a person is a tort (and in many 
jurisdictions a crime even without an injury),78 it would give notice to 
would-be perpetrators of the significance of the action, bring greater 
opprobrium to everyday violence, and empower victims with the 
knowledge that their treatment is not acceptable.  A person who is 
 
 76. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON CIVIC EDUC. IN THE NATION’S SCH., supra note 67, at 2. 
 77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (1965) (“(1) An actor is subject to 
liability to another for battery if (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact 
with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, 
and (b) an offensive contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.”); see 
also 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 16.2(a) (2d ed. 2003) (“But in 
addition to these more obvious bodily injuries, offensive touchings (as where a man puts his 
hands upon a girl’s body or kisses a woman against her will, or where one person spits into 
another’s face) will also suffice for battery under the traditional view.  The modern 
approach, as reflected in the Model Penal Code, is to limit battery to instances of physical 
injury and cover unwanted sexual advances by other statutes.  This is the prevailing view in 
those jurisdictions with new criminal codes . . . .  [A] minority of these codes follow a much 
broader view, sometimes extending the crime to any touching or physical contact, but more 
often requiring that the contact be ‘offensive,’  ‘insulting or provoking,’ or done ‘in a rude, 
insolent, or angry manner.’” (citations omitted)). 
 78. Id. 
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experiencing physical harm may respond differently if she understands the 
perpetrator’s actions are a violation of her rights that society has not just 
stigmatized but outlawed.  This awareness is conducive to seeking counsel, 
reporting crimes, or setting boundaries in interpersonal relationships.  There 
is a long history in this country of violence against women, in particular, 
not being treated as a “real crime,” which scholars have traced to coverture 
laws and a public/private distinction that functionally deprives women of 
the protection of the law.79  But it also reflects an inadequate understanding 
or acceptance of the most basic obligations of citizens to each other. 
A perennial example of the public’s lack of understanding of battery is 
the pie in the face of the public figure.80  Protesters attempt to hit some 
controversial figure, often a political conservative, in the face with a pie and 
media commentators treat it as harmless silliness.81  When the pie thrower 
is charged, reports may mention he was charged with assault or battery but 
fail to define the crime.82  Never is there any explanation of the fact that 
“unlawfully touching” a person, including by a substance put in motion, or 
making a person fear an unlawful touching, is a crime in the jurisdiction.83 
 
 79. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Sager, A Letter to the Supreme Court Regarding the Missing 
Argument in Brzonkala v. Morrison, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 155–56 (2000) (arguing that the 
Court should uphold the right of rape victims to bring federal claims against their rapists 
under the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994), as within Congress’s 
remedial powers because, historically, under legal doctrines such as coverture, a woman’s 
legal identity was subsumed upon marriage into that of her husband, who had the right to 
chastise her.  Such doctrines “legitimated, amplified, and gave legal force to malign 
impulses, and left women more vulnerable to violence and discrimination than they 
otherwise would have been” (citing RICHARD J. GELLES & MURRAY A. STRAUS, INTIMATE 
VIOLENCE 19 (1988))); see also G. Kristian Miccio, Male Violence—State Silence:  These 
and Other Tragedies of the 20th Century, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 339, 344 (2002) (“The 
liberty to beat wives, a liberty the common law granted husbands through the doctrine of 
coverture, is still part of our common culture.  Such violence is pervasive, and it is 
manifestly gendered.”).  Feminist theorists have critiqued the conception of a line between 
the private and the public that places deprivations of liberty by private actors, such as private 
violence against women, outside the realm of constitutional concern. Tracy E. Higgins, 
Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 
857 (2000). 
 80. See Peter Grier, Carl Levin to Ann Coulter:  The Political History of a Pie in the 
Face, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/
The-Vote/2010/0817/Carl-Levin-to-Ann-Coulter-the-political-history-of-a-pie-in-the-face. 
 81. See Timothy Stenovec, Pie in the Face:  Rupert Murdoch, Ann Coulter, Bill Gates 
and Tom Friedman Have All Gotten It, HUFFINGTON POST (July 19, 2011, 6:46 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/19/rupert-murdoch-pie-in-the-face_n_903757
.html#s311920 (“While it remains to be seen whether Jonnie Marbles will be punished for 
his attempted pieing of Rupert Murdoch, clowns from generations before are sure looking 
down, knowing that their legacy lives on.”). 
 82. See, e.g., 2 Arrested for Tossing Pies at Coulter, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 24, 2004, at 13; 
Anti-war Protester Hits Senate Armed Services Chairman Carl Levin in Face with Pie in 
Michigan, FOX NEWS (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/08/16/anti-war-
protester-hits-senate-armed-services-chairman-carl-levin-face-pie/. 
 83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (1965); supra note 77 and 
accompanying text. 
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Ms. Magazine, an organization one would expect to be particularly 
sensitive to the nonconsensual touching of women,84 celebrated the thirty-
fifth anniversary in 2011 of antigay activist Anita Bryant being hit in the 
face with a pie by posting an artist’s rendering, in a pop-art style, of 
Bryant’s cream covered face on its Facebook page.85  A student who threw 
a pie at Ann Coulter during a speaking event indicated his lack of 
understanding of his actions by telling a reporter, “When throwing a pie can 
be called assault and bombing civilians called collateral damage, you gotta 
laugh to stay sane.”86  Another pie thrower indicated he did not grasp that 
he had committed a crime (and tort) when he distributed a manifesto under 
his real name in the days after his stunt that “provided a complete and 
detailed confession to committing the crime of battery against William 
Kristol according to the prosecutor.”87  We might want to dismiss these 
incidents as the work of people with poor judgment, but their surprise at 
facing legal consequences for throwing things at people, and the consistent 
media reaction, indicates a lack of the most basic knowledge of the law 
among even college-educated citizens. 
I am not suggesting that more young people should be prosecuted for pie-
throwings and school-yard fights (especially in light of racial and class 
disparities in who benefits from prosecutorial discretion).88  I am, however, 
saying that everyone should be aware that “no hitting” (more precisely:  “no 
touching without permission”) is not just good etiquette, but the law, even if 
the law is enforced in only a minority of instances of unwanted touching.  
Nor am I suggesting that normalized violence results primarily from 
ignorance of the law, and therefore educating students about the law is the 
 
 84. Ms. Magazine, a feminist magazine that played an important role in the women’s 
movement, was “the first magazine to feature domestic violence on its cover.” Issues We 
Hope Steinem Keeps Fighting For . . ., DAILY NEWS, Mar. 25, 2009, at 37.  Ms. is currently 
published by the Feminist Majority Foundation, whose mission is to “advance women’s 
equality, non-violence, economic development, and, most importantly, empowerment of 
women and girls in all sectors of society.” Mission and Principles, FEMINIST MAJORITY 
FOUND., http://www.feminist.org/welcome/mandp.asp (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 85. The Facebook posting is no longer available, but for the image by Derek Erdman, 
see Christoper Frizzelle, Anita Bryant with Pie on Her Face—One of the Great Moments in 
the History of Humiliation, STRANGER (Aug. 2, 2011, 10:22 AM), http://slog.thestranger.
com/slog/archives/2011/08/02/anita-bryant-with-pie-on-her-faceone-of-the-great-moments-
in-the-history-of-humiliation. 
 86. J.D. Wallace, Al Pieda Member Says the Arrest Was Worth the Stunt, TUCSON NEWS 
(Oct. 26, 2004), http://www.tucsonnewsnow.com/story/2485057/al-pieda-member-says-the-
arrest-was-worth-the-stunt. 
 87. Mary Sell, Pie-Toss Letter Prompts Investigation:  Medlin Faces Judiciary Action by 
School, Possible Battery Charges, STUDENTS ACAD. FREEDOM (Apr. 8, 2005), 
http://www.studentsforacademicfreedom.org/news/694/Earlhampiethrowinginvestigation040
805.htm. 
 88. See generally Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial 
Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795 (2012) (arguing 
that implicit racial attitudes and stereotypes skew prosecutorial decisions in a range of 
racially biased ways); see also Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race:  The Power and 
Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 67 n.12 (1998) (noting that, in addition to 
race, “class and socio-economic status are both relevant to the treatment of criminal 
defendants and victims of crime”). 
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best path to changing the culture.  Research on teaching empathy to 
students is perhaps more promising in this regard.89  But where there is a 
failure of empathy, awareness of the law should deter perpetrators and 
empower victims. 
I use the pie-throwing example because it is not unreasonable for a 
layperson not to know that throwing something without causing an injury or 
even making contact could be a crime.90  It is much harder to understand 
the rash of recent examples of young people witnessing, recording, and 
distributing video of the touching or penetration of incapacitated women 
and their apparent failure to comprehend that they were witnessing or 
committing a crime and a tort.91 
D.  Ignorance of the Law and the Steubenville Rape Pattern 
In the most famous case of a minor raped in front of her peers, which 
occured in Steubenville, Ohio, witnesses did not recognize that a 
perpetrator penetrating the incapacitated victim’s vagina with his fingers 
constituted rape.  One witness explained that he did not try to stop the rape 
 
 89. See Jennifer Kahn, Can Emotional Intelligence Be Taught?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 
2013, § 6 (Magazine), at 44 (reporting on a number of programs designed to teach students 
emotional intelligence); Pam Belluck, For Better Social Skills, Scientists Recommend a Little 
Chekhov, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2013), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/03/i-know-how-
youre-feeling-i-read-chekhov/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (reporting findings that after 
reading literary fiction, people performed better on tests measuring empathy, social 
perception, and emotional intelligence). But see Katherine Beals, How To Teach Empathy, 
OUT LEFT FIELD (Oct. 20, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://oilf.blogspot.com/2013/10/how-to-teach-
empathy.html (arguing that such programs are expensive and detract from core subjects like 
social studies and world history, which teach empathy for people outside the student’s peer 
group). 
 90. For another illustration of widespread ignorance of battery, see Bridgette Dunlap, 
Learn Your Rights:  Touching a Pregnant Person’s Stomach Is Illegal and Has Been for 
Some Time, RH REALITY CHECK (Nov. 5, 2013, 4:17 PM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/
2013/11/05/learn-your-rights-touching-a-pregnant-persons-stomach-is-illegal-and-has-been-
for-some-time/ (discussing a story that went viral misreporting that Pennsylvania had passed 
a law making it newly illegal to touch a pregnant woman’s stomach without consent).  
Contrary to the media narrative, authorities issued a citation to a man who repeatedly 
touched a pregnant woman against her will under Pennsylvania’s existing harassment law, 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709 (West 2000), under which physical contact “with intent to 
harass, annoy or alarm another” is a summary offense. 
 91. See Connor Simpson, The Kids at the Steubenville Rape Party Told Cops They 
Should Have Stopped It, WIRE (March 24, 2013, 12:02 PM), http://www.theatlanticwire.
com/national/2013/03/steubenville-police-tapes/63463/; see also Nina Burleigh, Sexting 
Shame and Suicide, ROLLING STONE, Sept. 26, 2013, at 46 (reporting that three boys 
allegedly removed the clothing of an incapacitated 15-year-old girl (who later killed herself), 
drew all over her body with marker, digitally penetrated her, and took photos that were 
passed around her school); Abigail Pesta, ‘Thanks for Ruining My Life,’ NEWSWEEK (Dec. 
10, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/thanks-ruining-my-life-63423 (reporting 
that two sixteen-year-old boys stripped a girl and took pictures while digitally penetrating 
her); Stephen Harper ‘Sickened’ by Alleged ‘Sexual Criminal Activity’ Linked to Rehtaeh 
Parsons Tragedy, NAT’L POST (Apr. 11, 2013, 7:01 PM), http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/
04/11/harper-decries-criminal-activity-in-n-s-teens-death/ (reporting that a girl killed herself 
after four boys allegedly assaulted her and distributed pictures). 
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because “at the time, no one really saw it as being forceful.”92  Another 
tweeted, “If they’re getting ‘raped’ and don’t resist then to me it’s not 
rape.”93  The prosecutor explained that testifying witnesses “‘don’t think 
that what they’ve seen is a rape in the classic sense.’”94  These statements 
and the actions of the many witnesses indicate ignorance of the fact that it 
does not take a certain kind of penetration, amount of force, or injury to 
commit rape in Ohio and many other states.95 
Media coverage of the case treated the story as a cautionary tale about the 
dangers of social media rather than rape.96  This and similar cases 
demonstrate the prevalent misperception that the crime of rape is defined by 
popular understanding of the term rather than statute.97  If “classic” rape is 
something akin to rape at common law, there is widespread ignorance that 
the law has changed.98  Argument over what kind of penetration should 
constitute rape misses the point that the definition is not arrived at via 
opinion poll, and also suggests a lack of awareness that one can commit 
tortious and criminal batteries other than rape without any penetration or 
injury. 
 
 92. Juliet Macur & Nate Schweber, Rape Case Unfolds on Web and Splits City, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 17, 2012, at D1. 
 93. Ariel Levy, Trial by Twitter, NEW YORKER, Aug 5., 2013, at 38. 
 94. Id. 
 95. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(A) (LexisNexis 2010) (“‘Sexual conduct’ means 
vaginal intercourse between a male and female; anal intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus 
between persons regardless of sex; and, without privilege to do so, the insertion, however 
slight, of any part of the body or any instrument, apparatus, or other object into the vaginal 
or anal opening of another.  Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal or 
anal intercourse.”). 
 96. See, e.g., Matt Lombardi, Lisa Soloway & Sean Dooley, The Steubenville Rape 
Case:  The Story You Haven’t Heard, ABC NEWS (Mar. 13, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/
2020/steubenville-rape-case-story-heard/story?id=18705357. 
 97. See, e.g., Richard Cohen, Miley Cyrus, Steubenville and Teen Culture Run Amok, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/richard-cohen-miley-
cyrus-steubenville-and-culture-run-amok/2013/09/02/1cecafa6-11af-11e3-bdf6-
e4fc677d94a1_story.html (implying that the case did not concern a genuine rape and thus 
obscuring the fact that digital penetration is rape:  “The first thing you should know about 
the so-called Steubenville Rape is that this was not a rape involving intercourse. . . .  
Obviously, she was sexually mistreated”). 
 98. See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1105, 1133–61 (1986) (explaining that 
“force” or “threat of force” was traditionally an element of the crime of rape and assessing 
two reform models).  The Model Penal Code has provided for a third-degree felony of “gross 
sexual imposition” involving forms of nonconsenual sex that do not involve force or threat 
of force. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (2009).  Michigan’s statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 750.520a(o) (West 2004), was amended in 1983 to expand the crime to include penetration 
with objects and offensive sexual touching, male victims, and female perpetrators. Estrich, 
supra, at 1148.  It dispensed with the term “rape” like many states that labeled the expanded 
crime criminal sexual conduct or assault. Id.  Estrich warned that the well-intentioned 
renaming aimed at shedding the “common law baggage” associated with rape “risks 
obscuring the unique meaning and understanding of the indignity and harm of ‘rape.’” Id. 
See generally Deborah W. Denno, Why the Model Penal Code’s Sexual Offense Provisions 
Should Be Pulled and Replaced, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 207 (2003) (detailing out-of-date 
sexual offense provisions of the Model Penal Code that misrepresent the progressive 
thinking of the Code’s reporters and are out of step with modern attitudes and rape statutes). 
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What is additionally frightening is the Steubenville prosecutor’s 
speculation that only one in a thousand teens would realize that taking or 
distributing a video of a naked minor is illegal.99  If our society provided 
young people with a basic understanding of the law that governs their lives, 
they would assume this was illegal, regardless of whether the criminal laws 
of their state have caught up with cyberbullying, because sending around 
naked pictures of someone is almost certainly the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, among others.100  Victims who knew the 
law was on their side might seek help rather than engaging in self-harm, as 
has occurred in multiple instances.101 
That there have been so many cases of young people committing and 
distributing pictures of sexual batteries is obviously a much deeper problem 
than ignorance of the law.  However, ignorance deprives the law of its 
deterrent effect and deprives victims of recourse and support.  We can say 
everyone knows these things are wrong, but prosecutors are dealing with 
boys “who seem to think they are committing pranks with phones and 
passed out girls.”102  This kind of confusion would not be possible if high 
school students were taught that any kind of offensive touching is illegal 
and that there is such a thing as a privacy tort.  Where morality and empathy 
have failed, we can at least be clear about the law.  The ignorance of 
perpetrators, victims, and the public is contributing to lawlessness.103 
 
 99. Levy, supra note 93. 
 100. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 (2012) 
(“An actor who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe 
emotional harm to another is subject to liability for that emotional harm and, if the emotional 
harm causes bodily harm, also for the bodily harm.”); see also Elizabeth M. Jaffe, 
Cyberbullies Beware:  Reconsidering Vosburg v. Putney in the Internet Age, 5 CHARLESTON 
L. REV. 379, 390–91 (2011) (“Cyberbullying is actually just a new term that encompasses 
several very old wrongs:  intentional torts.”); 4 IAN C. BALLON, E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET 
LAW § 51.04[2] (2d ed. 2005) (“[R]evenge porn[, the distribution of intimate pictures online 
by a former mate,] may justify other tort claims as well, such as intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.”). 
 101. See Burleigh, supra note 91, at 46 (reporting on the suicides of Audrie Potts, Jill 
Naber, and Rehtaeh Parsons). It is, of course, impossible to know to what extent the photos 
are the cause of these women’s suicides. 
 102. Id. (“‘[T]he young men committing them are not seeing them as crimes, they see 
them as pranks.  And there’s no point in pulling a prank unless you share it.’  Anderson said 
parents and educators need to talk to younger boys about informed consent.  ‘When I speak 
to students, I tell boys that if a young woman isn’t of age, she isn’t capable of giving 
informed consent. . . .  And those cases, if you have sex, you can go to jail.  And the jaws 
drop, because right away the think of the sex they had at a party last weekend, where 
everybody was wasted.’”). 
 103. Battery provides just one example of legal rules every American should know.  
Others include basic principles of contract law.  Too many laypeople think signing a contract 
is the end of their rights because they are not aware that contract provisions can be void as 
against public policy or what a contract of adhesion is.  The idea that signatures are magic 
also leads laypeople to believe that they cannot enter into a contract without a writing or 
have rights outside a contract, such as those provided by statutes and ordinances.  This 
perpetuates power imbalances between individuals and the corporations, landlords, and 
employers with whom they contract, because a person who assumes she has no rights has no 
reason to obtain counsel, attempt to negotiate on her own, or even look up available legal 
information. 
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IV.  TEACHING LEGAL BASICS 
I cannot claim to know the optimal way to impart legal knowledge in a 
country struggling to teach its students basic math and reading, as I am not 
an education scholar.  There are, however, some models worth mentioning 
briefly.  A number of bar associations have programs aimed at engaging 
lawyers pro bono and training public school teachers to provide legal 
education, known as Law-Related Education (LRE).  The ABA holds an 
LRE conference every two years that focuses on civic education, but this 
might be an opportunity to integrate legal education into the existing work 
with teachers, as some state bars have done.104 
One of the most established LRE programs, “Street Law,” emphasizes 
practical legal knowledge.105  Founded at Georgetown Law Center in 1972, 
there are street law programs in every U.S. state that teach public school 
students and community groups about housing, employment, child custody, 
abuse and neglect, consumer law, criminal law, the juvenile justice system, 
police procedures, domestic violence, sexual assault, and other legal 
topics.106  Street Law programs also aim to teach young people “where 
rules and laws come from, how they can be changed, and why they are 
essential to society.”107  There are multiple models,108 but they often consist 
of law students teaching semester- or year-long courses in public high 
schools.109  By most, if not all, accounts, these programs provide invaluable 
experiences to both the law student instructors and the high school 
students110 and provide additional benefits such as pipeline programs that 
foster diversity in the legal profession.111 
Though they serve critical public service objectives, Renee Newman 
Knake notes that four decades of Street Law and other LRE programs have 
not democratized legal education.112  She proposes that law schools band 
 
 104. Janet Stidman Eveleth, Teaching Children About the Law, MD. B.J., May/June 2006, 
at 10, 14 (“We educate young people on how the law impacts their daily lives as citizens.  
Having people understand how a bill becomes a law is only one aspect . . . .  Understanding 
how that bill affects them, in terms of zoning, a contract or even in the context of a crime, is 
something our schools have never covered, but it is critical for our kids to understand.  These 
future adults will be consumers of the civil and criminal justice system, yet they have little or 
no understanding of it.”). 
 105. Richard Grimes, David McQuoid-Mason, Ed O’Brien & Judy Zimmer, Street Law 
and Social Justice Education, in THE GLOBAL CLINICAL MOVEMENT:  EDUCATING LAWYERS 
FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 2011, at 225, 225 (Frank S. Block ed., 2010). 
 106. Matthew M. Kavanagh & Bebs Chorak, Teaching Law As a Life Skill:  How Street 
Law Helps Youth Make the Transition to Adult Citizenship, 18 J. JUV. JUST. & DETENTION 
SERVICES 71, 72 (2003). 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Grimes et al., supra note 105, at 230 (describing the credit-bearing model, the 
nonclinical pro bono model, and the law student organizations model). 
 109. Kamina A. Pinder, Street Law:  Twenty-Five Years and Counting, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 
211, 231–32 (1998). 
 110. See generally Grimes et al., supra note 105; MacDowell, supra note 26; Pinder, 
supra note 109. 
 111. Kavanagh & Chorak, supra note 106, at 73. 
 112. Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing Legal Education, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1281, 
1305 (2013). 
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together for a systematic public information campaign aimed at increasing 
public awareness of one’s rights and how lawyers can help.113  This is a 
creative solution to the problem of people not hiring lawyers as a result of 
not realizing that they have a legal problem or knowing how to access 
affordable services.  That is a different (though related) problem than the 
lack of general knowledge of the law necessary for daily life and 
participation in a democracy apart from specific legal problems that lawyers 
can address.  But practical knowledge, like the type imparted in Street Law 
programs, might stimulate demand for legal services by increasing the 
public’s awareness of their rights and how the legal system works. 
The impact that law school–based Street Law programs can have is 
limited for a number of reasons.  First, according to proponents, the 
“primary rationale” for such programs is the professional development of 
law students rather than the education of the general public.114  
Additionally, widely replicating the model would prove difficult, as it is 
extremely time intensive and requires unusually dedicated students and 
teachers.  At Georgetown, law students take a two-hour seminar, teach three 
hours per week,115 and spend six “often grueling” weeks preparing for a 
mock trial competition.116 
There is also significant prep time required for class since the law student 
teachers must create their own lesson plans.117  The program relies on first-
time teachers reinventing the wheel rather than educators improving their 
skills over time and refining their curriculum.118  One Street Law alumna 
notes, “Some would argue that a program like Street Law belongs in a 
graduate school of education and not in a school of law,” but discounts this 
as the concern of those afraid to stray outside the traditional law school 
curriculum.119  However, one can acknowledge the value to law students 
but still believe that training teachers who intend to teach would be a better 
use of resources.  The Georgetown model could be subject to some of the 
same criticisms leveled at Teach For America—that young people who are 
not starting careers as teachers are thrown into urban classrooms with little 
training, contributing to the de-professionalization of teaching.120 
 
 113. Id. at 1312–16. 
 114. Grimes et al., supra note 105, at 229. 
 115. Pinder, supra note 109, at 212–13. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See id. at 215. 
 118. But see Grimes et al., supra note 105, at 225 (“While the sessions can be led by 
experienced experts—law teachers and practicing lawyers—they are often most effective 
when done by law students whose task is to learn the material themselves before helping 
others to understand it.  Law students often strike an immediate rapport with school pupils, 
in part because they may not be many years senior to their target audience.”). 
 119. Pinder, supra note 109, at 226. 
 120. Catherine Michna, Why I Stopped Writing Recommendation Letters for Teach for 
America:  And Why My Colleagues Should Do the Same, SLATE (Oct. 9, 2013, 2:38 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/education/2013/10/teach_for_america_recommendations_i
_stopped_writing_them_and_my_colleague.html. 
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Proponents argue that Street Law programs are most effective when 
sponsored by law school clinics.121  However, the efforts of law clinics are 
necessarily piecemeal, though they can be laboratories to develop 
approaches aimed at systemic change and have historically played an 
important role in public interest law.122  As in the case of the ABA’s 
emphasis on law school clinics and postgraduate fellows to provide legal 
services discussed above, relying too heavily on clinics risks fostering the 
idea that imparting basic legal knowledge is an act of charity by generous 
lawyers rather than an obligation of a society committed to the rule of law. 
Professional educators could, however, teach Street Law, other practical 
LRE curricula, and the form of dialogic argument taught through law.123  
Street Law has published a number of textbooks and provides information 
explaining how the curriculum aligns with “Common Core” requirements 
on its website.124  The ABA could add advocacy for basic practical legal 
education to its work for state-mandated civics programs.   
Law school–based Street Law programs have the benefit of programs 
tailored to the legal needs of particular inner-city communities, but these 
topics also have a place in a core curriculum for all populations.  The ability 
to recognize when one’s rights have been violated by police officers may be 
particularly important in a community targeted by “stop and frisk,” but this 
knowledge is also “practical” for students who seldom interact with police, 
in that it is useful for evaluating public policy and understanding how the 
law affects others.  Community-specific workshops on specific legal issues, 
like those taught by pro bono attorneys for Street Law, might also be 
expanded, but would need to supplement universal basic legal education for 
the law to be predictable and uniformly applied. 
CONCLUSION 
The rule of law is a nebulous concept, but central to the ideal promoted 
by the United States abroad and at home is the notion that universal laws 
must be uniformly applied.  The formalist reliance on procedures and 
institutions is inadequate to achieve uniform application of the law where 
those institutions are inaccessible due to lack of knowledge and counsel.  In 
the United States, the lawyers’ monopoly has led to a view of the law as the 
 
 121. Grimes et al., supra note 105.  Golub also sees law school clinics as an important 
tool for legal empowerment. Golub, supra note 2, at 173–74. 
 122. See STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 20–57 
(2008). 
 123. A recent study found that students who took a class in dialogic argument improved 
their writing significantly more than students who took a class that involved much more 
instruction and practice in expository writing. Deanna Kuhn & Amanda Crowell, Dialogic 
Argumentation As a Vehicle for Developing Young Adolescents’ Thinking, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 
545–52 (2011). 
 124. How Street Law Aligns with the Common Core State Standards, STREET L. 
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exclusive domain of lawyers, leaving laypeople with inadequate knowledge 
of their rights and responsibilities.  This ignorance deprives citizens of the 
protection of the law and the norms it represents, because wrongdoers are 
undeterred by laws they are not aware of, victims do not claim rights they 
do not realize they have, and government actors have limited incentive to 
address problems that go unrecognized by the public. 
Furthermore, the lack of understanding of how the law works and what 
lawyers do discourages laypeople from learning what the law is and how it 
could be improved, impairing the discourse and political process that should 
lead to just laws.  The current approach of the U.S. legal profession is 
consistent with its rule of law orthodoxy abroad, but promoting respect for 
the judiciary and access to lawyer-provided services exclusively leaves 
laypeople too dependent on the legal profession to mediate the laws that 
govern their lives. 
 
 
